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Gazprom’s position on the Russian gas market weakening
Ewa Paszyc
As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European 
market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared 
which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. 
The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the 
tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved 
by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fi-
scal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being ta-
ken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir 
Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are 
being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importan-
ce for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive 
right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports 
monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic 
market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some 
of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). 
The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of 
factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficul-
ties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private 
interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for 
a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation 
system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic 
Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to 
stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom 
itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the govern-
ment full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s 
concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s re-
cent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” 
(made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this 
year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening 
of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, 
the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas 
companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on 
the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly 
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Putin’s oligarchs – a new chapter 
in the redistribution of Gazprom’s assets 
In	2001	Alexey	Miller	–	Gazprom’s	CEO,	newly	appointed	by	President	Putin	–	started	his	






















What	 differentiates	 the	 current	 process	 of	 dividing	 up	Gazprom	 from	 that	 performed	 in	
the	1990s	is	its	much	larger	scale	during	Putin’s	second	term	in	office,	which	accelerated	










































































The most valuable parts were acquired 
by Putin’s friends, collaborators and 
business partners whom he had worked 
with during his career in St. Petersburg 
city hall, or his close allies from 
the period of his KGB service.






investors	and	ensure	 the	profitability	of	 the	Yamal	LNG	project,	 the	government	granted	
it	significant	tax	reliefs	(zero	tax	rate	on	extraction	(NDPI)),	and	lifted	the	export	duty	on	
any	LNG	produced	in	the	future7.	












on	 the	EU	gas	market	 and	acquire	 shares	 in	Western	 concerns.	 In	 July	2011,	 the	Ger-
man	energy	concern	EnBW	offered	to	sell	
Novatek	 25%	 of	 its	 shares	 (more	 than	
half	 of	 its	package)8	 in	VNG,	one	of	 the	





tential	 partners	 expect	 cheaper	 supplies	
of	 gas	 compared	 with	 that	 delivered	 by	
Gazprom	 under	 its	 long-term	 contracts.	
Novatek’s	own	extraction	costs	(similar	to	the	costs	borne	by	other	independent	gas	com-
panies	 in	Russia)	are	several	 times	 lower	 than	the	costs	borne	by	Gazprom.	This	would	
harm	Gazprom’s	export	monopoly,	however.	








thereby	 increasing	 their	 total	 share	package	 to	95%	 (in	2010	Mikhelson	bought	a	 total	
of	46%	of	the	holding’s	shares).	The	purchase	of	nearly	100%	of	Sibur’s	shares	was	pos-
sible	mainly	thanks	to	a	loan	provided	by	Gazprombank.	
• The Rotenberg brothers9 
Stroygazmontazh: the pipeline business 
In	2006,	the	brothers	Arkady	and	Boris	Rotenberg	–	Vladimir	Putin’s	childhood	friends	and	







































Novatek’s potential partners expect 
cheaper supplies of gas compared with 
that delivered by Gazprom under its 
long-term contracts. Novatek’s own ex-
traction costs (similar to the costs borne 
by other independent gas companies 
in Russia) are several times lower 
than the costs borne by Gazprom.
















In	April	2010	 the	Rotenberg	brothers	were	mentioned	on	 the	Forbes	 list	 of	 billionaires,	
and	Gazprom	sold	them	another	non-core	asset	–	the	company	Gazprombureniye,	which	
implements	 70%	 of	 the	 company’s	 contracts	 (involving	 geological	 analyses,	 construc-
tion,	renovation,	maintenance	of	oil	and	gas	wells	and	underground	gas	storage	facilities)	
and	carries	out	work	in	the	Bovanenkovo	gas	field	in	the	Yamal	Peninsula.	
• Yuri Kovalchuk 




















valuable	 asset	 from	 Gazprom,	 the	 com-
pany	LIDER,	which	among	other	activities	
manages	the	company’s	pension	fund	and	
the	Gazfond	 investment	 fund.	As	 Lider’s	




important	 for	 the	 Kremlin	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 electoral	 campaigns,	 and	 thus	 in	 effect	
































































Along with the assets making up 
the Gazprom-Media group, Kovalchuk 
has gained control over Russia’s 
largest nationwide media (TV and 
radio stations, newspapers) and 
thus created Russia’s biggest media 
holding. He also took over Video 
International company – a giant on 
the Russian media advertising market.



















































































Despite	 a	major	 change	 in	 the	market	 situation	 after	 2008	 (a	 drop	 in	 demand	 for	 gas	
in	Europe	caused	by	the	economic	crisis),	there	was	an	upsurge	in	the	extraction	of	gas	
by	Russian	producers	independent	of	Gazprom.	This	resulted	from	the	growing	profitability	








the	 system,	 etc.	 One	 of	 the	 few	 excep-
tions	was	a	long-term	contract	concluded	
in	2010	with	Novatek,	enabling	the	latter	
to	 supply	10	billion	m3	of	 its	 gas	 to	 the	
pipeline	network	per	year.	
The	Gazprom	 leadership’s	 reluctance	 towards	any	projects	 to	 split	up	 the	company	has	




Gazprom hampers or blocks other 
companies’ operations by limiting or 
refusing to accept supplies provided by 
independent producers to its pipelines, 
eliminating the possibility of connecting 
new fields to the system, etc. 


































(with	Shell	as	 its	operator),	was	 taken	over	by	Gazprom	 together	with	 the	contracts	 for	
the	export	of	LNG,	already	signed	at	that	
time.	 The	 gas	 part	 of	 the	 other	 project,	
Sakhalin-1,	 was	 suspended.	 Despite	
the	plans	laid	by	the	investors	(the	Ameri-
can	company	Exxon	Mobil	as	 the	opera-
tor,	 Japan’s	 SODECO,	 India’s	ONGK	and	
Rosneft)	 –	 who	 as	 early	 as	 2006	 had	
signed	a	preliminary	agreement	with	 the	
Chinese	company	CNPC	to	export	gas	to	
China	 –	 Gazprom	 decided	 that	 the	 gas	
from	Sakhalin-1	would	be	used	for	domes-
tic	consumption.	In	February	2012	Exxon	













rounds	 of	 talks	 between	 the	 company	 and	 Gazprom	 concerning	 the	 proposed	 creation	
of	an	export	joint	venture	have	also	been	futile.	Another	company,	TNK-BP,	which	applied	
The first crack in Gazprom’s exports 
monopoly was the company’s 
unprecedented consent to sharing 
the export revenues with Novatek. 
The agreement concerning the condi-
tions for the export of liquefied gas 
from the Yamal project carried out 
by Novatek stipulates that Gazprom 
formally maintains its exporter status 
and receives a small fee, while 
Novatek takes the export revenues.

























Vladimir	Putin	has	not	ruled	out	 liberalising	Russian	gas	exports	 in	the	future;	yet	 in	his	
opinion,	Gazprom’s	monopoly	in	this	area	prevents	Russian	companies	from	competing	on	
various	markets,	and	supports	gas	price	stability.	













other	 suppliers	 demand	 a	mere	 30%	 in	
advance.	Prime	Minister	Putin’s	repeated	
suggestions	to	eliminate	the	‘take	or	pay’	




















The relatively unrestrained develop-
ment of competition on the ever more 
lucrative domestic gas market may 
suggest that the Kremlin plans to 
reduce Gazprom’s activity to exports 
at the expense of the company’s 
involvement in the domestic market. 
The monopolist’s own extraction costs 
are growing so rapidly  that expensive 
Russian gas can only generate decent 
revenues on foreign markets.
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Gennady	 Timchenko	 (Novatek),	 the	 brothers	 Arkady	 and	 Boris	 Rotenberg	 (involved	 in	
the	 import	of	pipes	and	the	construction	
of	pipelines,	among	other	activities),	Yuri	
Kovalchuk	 (active	 in	 the	 insurance	 and	
media	 sector,	 among	 others)	 and	 many	
other	people	associated	with	 the	current	
ruling	 elite.	 Any	 further	 redistribution	





























In 2009, Inter RAO UES and OGK-1 
availed themselves of the right to ter-
minate their agreement with Gazprom, 
and since 1 January 2010 have been 
buying gas from Novatek. Furthermore, 
Itera has taken over some of Gazprom’s 
clients. LUKoil and TNK-BP 
have announced ambitious plans 
to develop their gas market segments 
and increase production volumes.
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The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES)	was	established	in	1990.	CES	is	financed	from	the	budget.	
The	Centre	monitors	and	analyses	the	political,	economic	and	social	situation	in	Russia,	Central	
and	Eastern	European	countries,	the	Balkans,	the	Caucasus	and	the	Central	Asia.	
CES focuses	 on	 the	 key	 political,	 economic	 and	 security	 issues,	 such	 as	 internal	 situations	
and	 stability	 of	 the	 mentioned	 countries,	 the	 systems	 of	 power,	 relations	 between	 political	
centres,	foreign	policies,	issues	related	to	NATO	and	EU	enlargement,	energy	supply	security,	
existing	and	potential	conflicts,	among	other	issues.	
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities. 































































supply	 routes),	and	of	 frequent	challenges	 to	Gazprom’s	pricing	policy	by	 its	customers,	
maintaining	 the	 export	monopoly	 in	 order	 to	 block	 competition	 and	maximise	 prices	 is	
no	 longer	 reasonable,	but	on	 the	other	hand,	 the	 lifting	of	 this	monopoly	could	damage	
the	company’s	position	on	the	domestic	market.
Currently,	any	exceptions	to	this	rule	(as	in	the	case	of	Novatek)	will	only	be	possible	at	
the	request	of	Vladimir	Putin,	and	only	for	those	selected	few	companies	which	are	under	
the	government’s	strict	control.	Only	a	change	in	the	market	situation	–	a	significant	increase	
in	the	demand	for	Russian	gas	which	the	concern	would	be	unable	to	cover	–	could	force	
liberalisation	of	the	export	monopoly,	but	even	so	that	would	not	bring	about	its	abolition.
•	What	seems	difficult	to	stop,	is	the	process	of	other	producers	pushing	the	monopolist	out	
of	the	domestic	market.	Had	it	not	been	for	the	crisis	which	eliminated	the	threat	of	a	gas	
shortage	in	Russia,	Gazprom	would	have	had	serious	problems	covering	both	domestic	and	
foreign	demand.	Until	the	future	launch	of	the	Yamal	fields,	over	the	next	ten	years	Russia	
will	barely	be	able	to	reach	the	expected	extraction	volume	without	the	active	participation	
of	independent	companies.	Their	investments	in	expanding	their	production	may	be	profita-
ble	when	wider	access	to	the	increasingly	lucrative	domestic	market	is	guaranteed.	
In	the	medium	term,	Gazprom	is	likely	to	remain	Russia’s	main	gas	supplier;	at	the	end	of	
2010	it	controlled	around	70%	of	 the	Russian	market.	The	relatively	unrestrained	deve-
lopment	of	competition	on	the	ever	more	lucrative	domestic	gas	market	may	suggest	that	
the	Kremlin	plans	to	reduce	Gazprom’s	activity	to	exports	at	the	expense	of	the	company’s	
involvement	in	the	domestic	market.	The	monopolist’s	own	extraction	costs	are	growing	so	
rapidly15	that	expensive	Russian	gas	can	only	generate	decent	revenues	on	foreign	markets.	
The	monopolist	may	see	the	domestic	market	as	its	priority	(with	all	the	resulting	consequ-
ences	for	independent	producers)	only	if	there	is	a	collapse	in	the	exports	of	Russian	gas.
